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THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD PROTECT THE RIGHT TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
ROBERT A. SEDLERt

It is my submission that the Constitution should protect the right to
same-sex marriage. Specifically, I contend that the Equal Protection Clause
should be interpreted by the Supreme Court to prohibit the state from
discriminating against same-sex persons by denying them the right to enter
into the legal relationship ofmarriage. Marriage is a legal relationship based
on commitment and intimacy. For constitutional purposes, it is a
fundamental right, which "the State not only must allow, but which, always
and in every age it has fostered and protected."' Of course, marriage has
always been understood to mean a legal relationship between a man and a
woman, and this is how marriage has been defined at common law and in
tDistinguished Professor of Law and Gibbs Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
1.Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe
v. Ullman, 361 U.S. 497,523 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court in Griswold,stated:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.
Griswold, 381 U. S. at 486. Since marriage is a fundamental right, due process and equal
protection challenges to restrictions on individuals' freedom to marry are evaluated against
the compelling governmental interest standard. Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of
American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REv. 173, 240 (2002). While traditional
restrictions on the freedom to marry, such as a prohibition on plural marriage, would satisfy
this standard, see Reynolds v. UnitedStates, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1879), most other restrictions
on the freedom to marry would not. Thus, a ban on marriage between persons of different
races, in addition to being unconstitutional as amounting to invidious racial discrimination,
is also violative of due process as improperly interfering with the freedom to marry. Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). It is also unconstitutional for a state to prohibit a
prison inmate from marrying without the permission of prison authorities, Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987), and to prohibit the remarriage of a divorced parent under a duty
of support to a child of a prior marriage unless the parent can demonstrate that he is in
compliance with an existing support order and that the child was not likely to become a
public charge. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978). Finally, since a person
may be validly married to only one person at a time, the right to marry includes the right to
divorce, and a state is constitutionally required to permit an indigent person to bring a
divorce proceeding without having to pay court fees. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
380-81 (1971).
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the marriage laws of all of the states. However, there is no logical or
rational reason why marriage should be limited to opposite-sex couples.
Same-sex couples can and do have the same kind of committed and intimate
relationships as opposite-sex couples. They get up in the morning, go to
work, take care of children if they have them-which they can do by means
of artificial insemination, surrogacy, and adoption-share life's joys and
problems, and unfortunately, like opposite-sex couples, sometimes break
up. The only difference between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples
in committed relationships is with respect to the sex of the person to whom
they make their commitment and with respect to the way in which they
express their physical intimacy with each other.2 This difference, I submit,
is not a constitutionally valid reason for denying them the same right to
marry that the state provides for opposite-sex couples, and therefore, the
denial of that right to them is a denial of equal protection of the laws.
I will approach this matter from the perspective of the litigating lawyer
who is asserting a constitutional challenge to the state's refusal to permit
same-sex persons to marry. Constitutional law develops in line of growth.'
A Supreme Court decision in one case serves as a precedent for its decisions
in later cases, and constitutional rights can be extended in the line of
growth. Lawyers use doctrine and precedent to expand constitutional
rights.4 The expansion of constitutional rights in the line of growth is
illustrated by the expansion of the constitutional right of privacy, first
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 from the protection of a married
2. The 2000 Census reported 506,745 same-sex-partner households, consisting of
259,807 male-partner households and 246,938 female-partner households. Census 2000
Special Reports: Married-Coupleand UnmarriedPartnerHouseholds: 2000, Feb. 2003,
Table 1. According to Census figures, 22.3% of the male-partner households and 34.3% of
the female-partner households include children. Id., Table 4. The 2000 Census data is
discussed in Robert Gebeloff & Mary Joe Patterson, Gays, Straights: Much in Common,
DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 28, 2003, at 9A.
3. See generally Terrance Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MIcH. L. REv.
1033, 1054 (1981) (discussing the development of constitutional doctrine in a line of
growth); Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An
Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 118-20 (1983).
4. For the litigating lawyer, the "stuff of constitutional litigation" is the Supreme
Court's precedents and the constitutional doctrine that has been promulgated by the Court
in prior cases. In deciding whether or not to assert a constitutional challenge to a particular
law or governmental action, and in deciding on the basis of that challenge, the lawyer must
look to the precedents and doctrine. The examination of precedents and doctrine will
determine the viability of a particular constitutional challenge and the basis on which that
challenge should be made. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitutionand PersonalAutonomy:
The Lawyering Perspective, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 773, 775 (1994).
5. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). In Griswold,the state law prohibiting married couples
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couple's right to use contraception in their intimate relations to the
protection of a woman's right to obtain an abortion in Roe v. Wade.6 In
Griswold,the Court found a constitutional right to privacy and held that this
right of privacy protected as a fundamental right the right of married
couples to use contraception in their intimate relations.'
The Court in Griswold was in considerable disagreement as to the
constitutional basis for the newly-proclaimed constitutional right ofprivacy.
Douglas, writing the Court's opinion, found the right of privacy in the
"penumbras" of specific constitutional provisions that reflected "privacy"
values, such as the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments.' Goldberg,
Warren and Brennan found it in the Ninth Amendment, which had never
before been invoked to protect individual rights. 9 White and Harlan found
that it inhered in substantive due process.'0 The doctrinal difference on the
Court was resolved by one sentence in the Blackmun opinion for the Court
in Roe v. Wade, in which he said simply that the right to privacy was
from using contraception in their intimate relations implicated both the fundamental right
of marriage and the fundamental right of reproductive freedom. See Sedler, supra note 4,
783 (1994). For a discussion of the development of these two fundamental rights, see id. at
783-87.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a more complete discussion of the development of the
constitutional protection of personal autonomy, see Sedler, supra note 4. For a detailed
discussion of the development of a constitutional right to abortion from GriswoldtoRoe, see
Robert A. Sedler, Abortion, Physician-AssistedSuicide and the Constitution:The Viewfrom
Without and Within, 12 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 529, 531-43 (1998).
7. Griswold,381 U.S. at 485. Because the right of married couples to use contraception
in their intimate relations involved the exercise of a fundamental right for constitutional
purposes, the constitutionality of the state law prohibiting such use was evaluated under the
exacting compelling governmental interest standard of review. In terms of the development
of constitutional doctrine in the line of growth, Griswold had the effect of reviving the
Court's seemingly forgotten decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In that
case, the Court held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds an Oklahoma law
providing for the compulsory sterilization of persons convicted of three felonies "involving
moral turpitude," but exempting "white collar" crimes such as embezzlement, political
offenses and tax law violations, from the required sterilization. Id. at 543. Douglas, also
writing for the Court in Skinner, found that the compulsory sterilization requirement violated
the fundamental right of "marriage and procreation," Id. at 541, and so applied the
compelling governmental interest standard of review. If the Court gave any scrutiny at all
to the classification, it could have invalidated the state law under the rational basis standard
of review as being "arbitrary and irrational."
The Court subsequently held that as a matter of equal protection, the right to use
contraception extended to unmarried persons as well. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453
(1972).
8. Griswold,381 U.S. at 484-85.
9. Id. at 486-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502-06 (White, J., concurring).
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"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.""
As might be expected, there has been much academic debate about
Griswold and the constitutional basis of a right of privacy. 12 From the
lawyer's standpoint, however, the academic debate about the basis of a
constitutional right of privacy at the time of Griswold was completely
irrelevant. Griswold had recognized a constitutional right of privacy, and
in the wake of Griswoldlawyers could, and did, use this constitutional right
of privacy to challenge the constitutionality of the anti-abortion laws that
existed in practically all of the states at that time. 3 If it had not been for
Griswold,a viable constitutional basis for challenging the constitutionality
of anti-abortion laws simply would not have existed at that time.14
The argument for the lawyers challenging the anti-abortion laws was
obvious. 5 Griswold held that reproductive freedom was a fundamental
right,' 6 so that the compelling governmental interest standard of review
applied. With regard to the reproductive freedom of the pregnant woman,
there is no logical difference between using contraception to prevent an
unwanted pregnancy from occurring and having a medical abortion to undo
an unwanted pregnancy that has occurred because contraception was not
used or has failed. Thus, under the compelling governmental interest
standard of review, the state cannot prohibit or significantly restrict the
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
12. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The "New" Substantive Due Process and the
DemocraticEthic: A Prolegomenon,1976 BYU L. Rev. 43 (1976); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling
the Strands ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981 (1979); Michael J. Perry,
Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive
Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection
ofPrivacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 173 (1979).
13. At the time of Roe, thirty states, including Texas, where the Roe challenge was
brought, had in effect laws that prohibited an abortion except where necessary to save the
life of the mother. Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.2. Fourteen other states, including Georgia, the
state of origin of the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), had
"liberalized" abortion laws with significant regulatory restrictions, and only four states,
Washington, Alaska, New York and Hawaii had repealed criminal penalties for abortions
performed by a physician in the early stages of pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140-41 n.37.
The status of abortion was not clear in a few states. Id.
14. See the further discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note 4, at 794-96; Sedler,
supranote 6, at 539-41.
15. The author litigated the challenge brought to the Kentucky "life-only" anti-abortion
law on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky. Crossen v. Attorney Gen.,
344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky.1972) (three judge), vacated and remanded by 410 U.S. 950
(1973).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). This part of Griswold was
supported by the now-revived Skinner and subsequent Eisenstadtdecisions. See discussion
supranote 7.
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ability of a woman to obtain a medical abortion.
But, of course, there is a difference between a ban on contraception and
a ban on abortion. It is difficult to see what legitimate, let alone compelling
interest, a state could assert in prohibiting the use of contraception, and the
state was not able to assert any such interest in Griswold.7 A ban on
abortion, however, advances the state's interest in protecting human life
from the moment of conception. The overwhelming number of pregnancies,
if uninterrupted, will result in a live birth. The lawyers for the state, in their
defense of the anti-abortion laws, thus could have distinguished Griswold
on a constitutionally principled basis; that is, on a basis that was consistent
with the line of growth of existing constitutional doctrine applicable to the
protection of reproductive freedom. And, staying within the analytical
framework of the compelling governmental interest standard, the Court
could have held that the state's interest in protecting potential human life
was compelling, and that a ban on abortion was the only effective way, and
thus the least drastic means of advancing that interest. The Court then,
consistent with existing constitutional doctrine, could have upheld the
constitutionality of the challenged anti-abortion laws.18
But constitutional law can also be extended in the line of growth. In
Roe v. Wade, the Court, adopting a "stages of pregnancy" formulation, held
that the state's interest in protecting potential human life does not become
"compelling" until the stage of viability has been reached, so that the state
could not constitutionally prohibit pre-viability abortions. 9 After the stage
of viability has been reached, the state may prohibit abortion except where
the abortion was necessary to protect the woman's life or health.20 Since
about 90% of the abortions in this country are performed during the first 12
weeks of pregnancy,2' and since no ethical doctor would perform a postviability abortion unless it is necessary to protect the woman's life or health,
the effect of Roe v. Wade was to make abortion "available on demand., 22 In
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,23 the Court replaced the stages of pregnancy
formulation with an undue burden formulation, but affirmed the essential
holding of Roe that the state could not prohibit a pre-viability abortion at all
or even a post-viability abortion necessary to protect the life or health of the
17. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
18. See the discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note 4, at 787-88.
19. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
20. Id. at 163-64.
21. See the discussion and review of data concerning abortions in Sedler, supra note
6, at 543-44.
22. Id. at 539.
23. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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24

In defining the meaning of broadly-phrased and open-ended
constitutional provisions such as due process and equal protection, the
Court is necessarily engaged in constitutional balancing and in making
value judgments. It is making value judgments as to the values that will be
embodied in the concepts of due process and equal protection and is
balancing the importance of individual and governmental interests in the
context presented. I have explained Roe v. Wade as a case where the Court
was engaged in constitutional balancing and made a value judgment about
the relative constitutional importance of the woman's interest in
reproductive freedom and the state's interest in protecting potential human
life in the context of state prohibitions on abortion. It made the value
judgment in favor of the woman's reproductive freedom interest and thus
held that the state's interest in protecting potential human life did not
become compelling until the stage of viability had been reached. While it
could have made the opposite value judgment, it did not, and the result is
that, under the Constitution, a woman has the right to a safe and legal
abortion.2 6
We turn now to the argument that the Constitution should protect the
right to same-sex marriage. In fashioning a constitutional argument the
litigating lawyer must make an initial decision as to what will be the
strongest doctrinal basis for the claimed constitutional right. In my
opinion, the strongest doctrinal basis for asserting a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage is found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. I say this despite the fact that the argument will put
heavy reliance on the Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas,28 where
the Court held that as a matter of due process, the state could not prohibit
oral and anal sex between same-sex persons.29 Indeed, I see Lawrence as
providing the same impetus to recognition of a constitutional right to samesex marriage as Griswold provided to recognition of a constitutional right
to abortion in Roe v. Wade. This is because in Lawrence, the Court made it
unmistakably clear that the state could not justify a prohibition on oral and
24. Id. at 846. See the discussion of Roe and Casey in Sedler, supra note 4, at 788-90.
25. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 3, at 115-20.
26. See the discussion of the aftermath and societal impact of Roe in Sedler, supranote
6, at 539-45.
27. See the discussion of this point in connection with the Roe challenge to antiabortion laws on due process rather than equal protection grounds in Sedler, supra note 4,
at 792-96.
28. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
29. See id.
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anal sex between same-sex persons on the ground that the state considered
this kind of sex to be "immoral." 3 By removing morality as a permissible
justification for the discriminatory treatment of same-sex persons, the Court
at the same time has removed the morality justification that has been
traditionally asserted for a ban on same-sex marriage. So, before developing
the equal protection argument in support of a constitutional right to samesex marriage, it is necessary to discuss the holding and rationale of
Lawrence.
In Lawrence, the Court held violative of due process a Texas law
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in oral or anal
sex.31 In so doing, the Court overruled its earlier decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick,3 2 where the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld a Georgia law
prohibiting all persons from engaging in oral or anal sex.33 However, the
challenge there was brought by two gay males, and the Court's decision was
based on the fact that the Constitution did not protect the right to engage in
"homosexual sodomy." At the heart ofBowers was the Court's emphasis on
the state's entitlement to prohibit sexual conduct that it considered to be
"immoral." Justice White, writing for the Court, formulated the issue as
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very
long time.,3 4 He went on to say that "[p]roscriptions against that conduct
have ancient roots. 35 Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, said
that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been
subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization,"
and that "[c]ondemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in JudeaoChristian moral and ethical standards., 36 He concluded that since there was
no "fundamental right" to engage in homosexual sodomy, the rational basis
standard of review applied, and that under that standard the state's
legitimate interest in enforcing moral standards justified a prohibition on
homosexual sodomy.37
In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, Justice Stevens maintained that the
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 2483.
Id. at 2476, 2484.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 187-89.

34. Id. at 190.
35. Id. at 192.
36. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. Iunderstood Bowers as holding that sexual freedom was not a fundamental right.,
so that the state could constitutionally prohibit all sex between unmarried persons, on the
ground that the state considered such sex to be "immoral."
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Burger analysis ignored the fact that "[o]ur prior cases make two
propositions abundantly clear."38
First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married
persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship,
even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices
by unmarried as well as married persons.3 9
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that
"Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in
Bowers and should control here. Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."4
In leading up to this conclusion, Justice Kennedy first reviewed the
Griswold line of cases, citing Eisenstadtfor the proposition that a ban on
contraceptive use by unmarried persons impaired the exercise of their
personal rights.'" He then noted, as I pointed out earlier, that Griswold and
Eisenstadtwere part of the background for Roe v. Wade, and, coupled with
4 2 where the Court invalidated
Carey v. PopulationServices, International,
a ban on the distribution of contraceptives to minors, confirmed that the
reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection of the rights

38. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes
and citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003). In justifying the overruling of
Bowers, Justice Kennedy pointed out that stare decisis was not an "inexorable command."
He also made a distinction between the Court's overruling a prior decision recognizing a
constitutional liberty interest, where "individual or societal reliance on the existence of that
liberty interest cautions with particular strength against reversing course," and overruling
a decision denying recognition to a constitutional liberty interest, such as Bowers, where
there has not been detrimental reliance on that decision. He also noted that, "Bowers itself
causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance contradict its essential
holding." Id. at 2483 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 2477.
42. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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of married adults.43 He then launched into an attack on the rationale of
Bowers. In defining the issue in terms of whether homosexuals had a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy, the Bowers Court, according to
Kennedy, "discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the
liberty interest at stake."" As he stated:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The
laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their
penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the45liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.
Kennedy went on to make the point that the state should not be permitted
to "define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent
' Here the
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."46
effect of the law was to deny gay and lesbian persons the ability to express
themselves in intimate conduct with another person and so to create a more
intimate personal bond. As Kennedy concluded: "When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice."4' 7
There are three additional components of the Kennedy opinion in
Lawrence that are relevant in support of the argument that the Constitution
protects the right to same-sex marriage. 48 First, Kennedy definitely rejected
43. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.
44. Id. at 2478.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Kennedy went to great lengths to challenge the Bowers majority's use of history to
show that "proscriptions against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots," contending that
"the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion
and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate." Id. at 2478-80. There can be
no doubt, however, that as an historical matter, in the United States and the Western world,
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the morality justification for a ban on sex between persons of the same sex.
He said that the Court in Bowers made the point that "for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral,"
and that this condemnation "has been shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
family. 49 Justice Kennedy then went on to say:
These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of
the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law. "Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."5
Citing with approval Justice Stevens' position in Bowers that "the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting that practice," Justice Kennedy stated that it was now
controlling.5" Lawrence then firmly establishes that the state cannot
constitutionally prohibit sex between same-sex persons on the ground that
it is "immoral." To put it another way, the state's asserted interest in
"promoting morality" is not a legitimate interest to justify a ban on sex
between same-sex persons. For the same reason, as I will argue
subsequently, the state's interest in "promoting morality" is not a legitimate
interest to justify denying same-sex persons the right to marry.
Second, Kennedy said that the foundations of Bowers "have sustained
serious erosion"5 from the Court's recent decisions in Casey, where it
affirmed the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade,53 and in Romer v. Evans,54
where it held that a Colorado state constitutional provision depriving
marriage has always been limited to one man and one woman. Justice Kennedy also noted
that Burger's reference to "the history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral
and ethical standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite
direction," such as a holding of the European Court of Human Rights that laws proscribing
homosexual conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. Id. at
2481. The fact that same-sex marriage has been held by Canadian courts to be protected
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and the likely legalization of same-sex marriage in
Canada, will be discussed subsequently.
49. Id. at 2480.
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 2484.
52. Id. at 2482.
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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homosexual persons of protection under state anti-discrimination laws was
violative of equal protection as class-based discrimination directed at
homosexuals.55 In Casey, the Court set forth in sweeping terms the
constitutional protection of personal autonomy. Casey, said Justice
Kennedy, "again confirmed that our laws and traditions afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education." 56 And he went on to say that, "Persons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do." 57 As the above discussion indicates, denying same-sex persons
the right to marry denies them the right to seek autonomy with respect to
the most personal of all decisions, the right to enter into a legally protected
relationship with a person whom they love.
In Romer, said Justice Kennedy, the Court "struck down class-based
legislation directed at homosexuals as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause," concluding that "the provision was 'born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected,' and further that it had no rational relation to a
legitimate governmental purpose."58 The Court's citation of Romer in
Lawrence as eroding the foundations of Bowers supports the contention that
discrimination against same-sex persons is not rationally related to the
advancement of a legitimate governmental purpose.
This point segues into the third component of Lawrencethat is relevant
in support of the argument that the Constitution protects the right to samesex marriage. The plaintiffs in Lawrence argued that the ban on anal and
oral sex only between persons of the same sex was violative of equal
protection. 59 The Court decided the case on due process grounds in order to
make it clear that as a constitutional matter the state could not prohibit any
sexual conduct between consenting adults in private.6" In so doing, the
Court expounded on the proposition that a prohibition on conduct engaged
in only by homosexual persons, even one that included a prohibition on that
55. Id. at 635-36.
56. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481. In Casey the Court stated that "[t]hese matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
57. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482.
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 2472.

60. Id.at 2482.
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conduct when engaged in by heterosexual persons, was a form of
discrimination against homosexual persons. In a broader sense, Justice
Kennedy was explaining the relationship between liberty and equality of
treatment. He stated as follows:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and
the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive
validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as
drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The
central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this
case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent
demeans the lives of homosexual persons.6 '
By the same token, it can be contended that denying same-sex persons
the right to marry solely because the way in which they physically express
their intimacy differs from the way in which opposite-sex persons
physically express their intimacy demeans the lives of same-sex persons. It
says in effect that they are "less equal" than opposite-sex persons who wish
to marry and "is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and private spheres."62
It will be noted that nowhere in the Kennedy opinion is there any
discussion of standards ofreview. As Justice Scalia points out in his dissent,
the Court did not hold in Lawrence that the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy (or for that matter in any sexual relations between unmarried
persons) is a fundamental right for due process purposes, so as to render the
Texas law subject to strict scrutiny.63 And it does seem clear that insofar as
standards were concerned, the Court was applying the rational basis
standard of review, concluding that, "The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual. 6 4 In the final analysis then, the Court in
Lawrence, applying the rational basis standard of review, held that due
61. Id.
62. id.
63. Id. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2484.
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process protects the right of consenting adults to engage in sexual activity
in private, and that the state has no legitimate interest in prohibiting that
conduct on the ground that it considers it to be "immoral."
This brings us to the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor. Justice
O'Connor, who was part of the majority in Bowers, was unwilling to
overrule that case.65 She based her decision on equal protection grounds,
focusing on the fact that the law discriminated between same-sex and
opposite-sex persons with respect to permissible sexual activity.6 6 For the
lawyer claiming that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the state from
denying same-sex persons the right to marry, considerable guidance can be
obtained from Justice O'Connor's opinion. Justice O'Connor began by
explaining the operation of the rational basis standard of review for equal
protection purposes.67 She noted that under this standard of review,
economic and tax legislation will usually be upheld.68 But under rational
basis review, said O'Connor, the Court has held that some objectives, "such
as 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group"' 6 9 are not
legitimate state interests. In that situation, she said, the Court has applied a
"more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws
under the Equal Protection Clause., 70 Further, she said, the Court has been
more likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional
where it "inhibits personal relationships." '71 In O'Connor' s view, the Texas
law was unconstitutional because it was targeted against homosexual
persons as a class and reflects moral disapproval of homosexual persons as
a class. As she stated:
Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause. .. to justify a law that
discriminates among groups of persons.
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because
legal classifications must not be "drawn for the purpose of

65. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2484-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2485.
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disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."72
Since she found that the Texas law was "'born of animosity toward the class
of persons affected' 73 and discriminates against homosexual persons by
"'making the conduct that defines the class criminal,', 7 4 she held that it was
violative of equal protection.75
Both the Kennedy and O'Connor opinions make it clear that the case
did not involve the constitutionality of other forms of discrimination against
homosexual persons, such as denying same-sex persons the right to marry.
Kennedy observed that the case did not involve "whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter.",76 And O'Connor specifically stated:
That this law as applied to private consensual conduct is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean
that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as
national security or preserving the traditional institution of
marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the
asserted state interest in this case--other reasons exist to promote
the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group.

77

72. Id. at 2486 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
73. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
74. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
75. Id. at 2487.
76. Id. at 2484.
77. Id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia
argued that society's belief that certain forms of sexual behavior are "'immoral and
unacceptable' is a rational basis for prohibiting that conduct. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)). The Court's reasoning
in rejecting this argument, said Scalia, "leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples." Id. at 2496. He went on to say that "'preserving the
traditional institution of marriage' is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral
disapproval of same-sex couples." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting ante, at 2488
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). However, the lawyer arguing that the Constitution protects the
right to same-sex marriage would not rely on the hyperbolic language in Justice Scalia's
dissent as support for that argument. And the lawyer for the state, attempting to assert a
legitimate interest advanced by the prohibition on same-sex marriage, would certainly
disagree that this interest is "just a kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval
of same-sex couples."
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While Lawrence, of course, did not indicate a disposition on the part of
the Court to hold that a ban on same-sex marriages is unconstitutional,
nonetheless, as stated earlier, the lawyer asserting the constitutional
challenge to such a ban would put heavy reliance on Lawrence. First and
most important, the Court in Lawrence removed moral disapproval as a
permissible justification for the discriminatory treatment of same-sex
persons and thereby has removed the morality justification that has been
traditionally asserted to justify a ban on same-sex marriages. As O'Connor
emphasized, the state will have to assert some other reason to support its
maintenance of the traditional institution of marriage. And the fact that the
institution ofmarriage has traditionally been limited to opposite-sex persons
is not in and of itself a legitimate reason for maintaining it that way. Rather
the state will have to assert an independent interest, apart from tradition, for
doing so.
Second, both the Kennedy and O'Connor opinions in Lawrence
recognize the legitimacy of same-sex relationships and the human dignity
of persons who choose to enter into them. This relationship, said Kennedy,
"is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals."7 8 O'Connor said that the state could not discriminate against
homosexual persons by "making the conduct that defines the class
criminal." 9 In light of Lawrence, the state cannot justify the differential
treatment of persons in same-sex relationships solely because those
relationships are different from opposite-sex relationships. As a result of
Lawrence, the Constitution protects all intimate relationships, homosexual
as well as heterosexual.
Third, both the Kennedy and O'Connor opinions stress the
constitutional importance of personal relationships. O'Connor pointed out
that the Court has been more likely to hold a law unconstitutional where it
"inhibits personal relationships."8 Kennedy went further in relating samesex relationships to the constitutional protection of personal autonomy, a
component of which is the right to marry. In referring to the constitutional
protection of personal autonomy, Kennedy said that "[p]ersons in a
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual persons do."'" Since marriage has long been held to be a
fundamental right for constitutional purposes, and since same-sex persons
can benefit from the institution of marriage in the same way as opposite-sex
78. Id. at 2478.
79. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 2485.
81. Id. at 2482.
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persons, it can be contended that the state should have to assert a very
important justification for denying same-sex persons the same right to enter
into the marriage relationship that it affords to opposite-sex persons.
Finally, Lawrence reinforces the holding of Romer, where the Court
struck down as "class-based legislation directed at homosexuals" a state
constitutional provision depriving homosexual persons ofprotection under
state anti-discrimination laws.82 In Lawrence, Kennedy, who also authored
the Court's opinion in Romer, asserted the right of homosexual persons to
equality of treatment and the right to be free from irrational discrimination.
He noted, "Where homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and private spheres."83
The above analysis of Lawrence and the reinforcement of Romer in
Lawrence indicate the essential elements of the constitutional argument in
favor of same-sex marriage. One. Marriage is a very important individual
interest, rising to the level of a fundamental right where opposite-sex
persons are involved. Same-sex persons can derive the same benefits as
opposite-sex persons from being permitted to enter into the institution of
marriage. The right to enter into the institution of marriage reflects the
exercise of personal autonomy, which is strongly protected under the
Constitution. Same-sex couples can and do have the same kind of
committed and intimate relationships as opposite-sex couples. The only
difference is with respect to the sex of the person to whom they make their
commitment and the way in which they express their physical intimacy with
each other, and Lawrence holds that the state cannot prohibit people from
entering into these relationships.
Two. Under the Equal Protection Clause, same-sex persons have the
right to equality of treatment and cannot be subject to irrational
discrimination by the state. Under Lawrence, the state cannot discriminate
against them in any way, including by denying them the right to marry,
because of moral disapproval of their relationship.
Three. The state must assert an important interest to justify denying
same-sex persons the same right to marry as it provides to opposite-sex
persons. If the state cannot assert such an interest, the denial to same-sex
persons of the right to marry constitutes irrational discrimination, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The first two components of the argument are fully supported by
Lawrence and Romer. This being so, the constitutional result will depend
82. Id. at 2474 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 624).

83. id. at 2482.
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on whether the state can assert a sufficiently important interest to justify its
across the board denial to same-sex persons of the right to marry.
In evaluating the constitutional importance of the interest asserted by
the state, it is necessary to analyze the operation of the rational basis
standard of review where the state discriminates against persons on the
basis of their membership in an identifiable group. Here I want to expand
on Justice O'Connor's discussion of this point in Lawrence. She says that
the Court has applied "a more searching form of rational basis review" 4
where the law is motivated by "'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group."' 85 She illustrates this point by four cases: Departmentof
Agriculture v. Moreno,86 invalidating as discrimination against "hippies" a
provision of the federal food stamp law denying food stamps to an
otherwise eligible households containing unrelated individuals; Eisenstadt
87
v. Baird,
invalidating a state law prohibiting the distribution of
88
contraceptives to unmarred persons; Cleburnev. CleburneLiving Center,
striking down a city's refusal to issue a permit for a group home for
retarded persons because of hostility to their living in the neighborhood;
and Romer. She also refers to Plyer v. Doe,89 where the majority opinion
applied rational basis to invalidate a state law denying a free public
education to illegal alien children.
The Court's application of the rational basis standard of review in these
cases, I would submit, must be understood in terms of the Court's
underlying value judgment about the justification for the particular form of
discrimination practiced against the particular group. When the Court first
dealt with the constitutional permissibility of gender-based discrimination
in Reed v. Reed,90 it apparently was applying the rational basis standard of
review.9 However it made a value judgment in Reed, which it confirmed
two years later in Frontierov. Richardson,92 that the government could not
justify gender-based classifications on the basis of stereotyped assumptions
about men and women and their respective societal roles, even though those
assumptions may have been objectively reasonable in light of the societal
84. Id.at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Id. (quoting Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
86. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
87. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
89. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
90. 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
91. Id.at 76. It was only in the later case of Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), that
the Court specifically held that the constitutionality of gender-based classifications was to
be evaluated under the heightened scrutiny of the important and substantial relationship test.
92. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
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situation of women compared to men.93 In Reed, the Court held
unconstitutional a state law preferring males to females when two persons
were otherwise equally entitled to be the administrator of an estate. The
state contended that the purpose of the law was to avoid one class of
contests over the appointment of administrators and that the legislature
might reasonably have concluded that, in general, men are more qualified
to act as an administrator than women.94 The Court rejected thisjustification
as being constitutionally permissible, in stating that, "[t]o give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other sex, merely
to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by Equal Protection." 95 This
legislative choice was not "arbitrary" in the sense of being objectively
unreasonable, because at that time men were more likely to be engaged in
the workforce while women were more likely to be staying at home, so the
legislature could reasonably conclude that in general men were more
qualified to act as administrators.9 6 It was "forbidden by equal protection,"
because the Court made the value judgment that the purported
administrative convenience, as it relates to stereotyped assumptions about
men and women and their respective societal roles, was a constitutionally
insufficient justification for a gender-based classification. 97 In Frontiero,the
gender-based classification was challenged only on the basis of its overinclusiveness. 98 All servicewomen who could show that they were the
primary breadwinner in the marriage received a dependency allowance. All
servicemen received the dependency allowance automatically.99 The
government argued that the over-inclusive classification advanced the
interest of administrative convenience, since the government could
reasonably assume that the overwhelming number of servicemen were the
primary breadwinners in their marriage while the overwhelming number of
servicewomen were not.'° The Court rejected this justification, stating that,
"[any] statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely
for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, [violates equal
protection]."' 0 '
93. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
94. Id. at 76.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 76-77.
98. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1973).
99. Id. at 678-79.
100. Id. at 681-82.
101. Id. at 690.
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The Court made this value judgment about administrative convenience
and stereotyped assumptions precisely because it was these "gross,
stereotyped distinctions between the sexes"'10 2 that had put women in a
subordinate role in society. Since at the time these stereotyped assumptions
of Reed and Frontierowere true for the great majority of men and women
living in American society, gender-based classifications would almost
always be objectively reasonable, since they would almost always advance
the administrative convenience interest. This is why they were so pervasive.
If the Court then held that administrative convenience was a sufficient
justification for a gender-based classification, it would have been
legitimatizing and perpetuating the present consequences of a long history
of societal discrimination. In light of the value judgment the Court had
made, administrative convenience could not be a "legitimate" governmental
interest to justify a gender-based classification, and any such classification
justified in terms of administrative convenience would be struck down as
"arbitrary."' 03
The Court likewise made a value judgment about the wrongfulness of
discrimination against out-of-wedlock children, when, applying the
articulated rational bass standard of review, it invalidated most of the
traditional forms of discrimination against them. In Levy v. Louisiana,104the
Court, in invalidating a state law denying out-of-wedlock children the right
to bring a wrongful death action for the death of their mother, held for the
first time that out-of-wedlock children could not constitutionally be singled
out for disparate treatment solely because of their status, as had previously
been assumed. The assumption on which discrimination against out-ofchildren was predicated was that rights dependent on or derived from family
relationships could be accorded only to relationships based on marriage. All
relationships formed or created outside of marriage, including the parentchild relationship, were "illegitimate" and, for that reason, could be denied
legal recognition.0 5 The value judgment that the Court made was that the
interest of the state in encouraging and preserving marriage as the basis of
legal family relationships did notjustify the discriminatory treatment of outof-wedlock children. This is because the children were not responsible for
their status and their status bore no relationship to their ability to participate

102. Id. at 684.
103. As the Court stated in Craig v. Boren: "Decisions following Reed... have
rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify
gender-based classifications." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1996).
104. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
105. Id. at 70.
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in and contribute to society. 106 As the Court stated, in a later application of
Levy:
[the] status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. But visiting this condemnation of the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing." 7
In light of this value judgment, it followed that most of the traditional forms
of discrimination against out-of-wedlock
children were "arbitrary and
08
irrational" and hence unconstitutional. 1
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,' °9 the Court carefully
considered the appropriate standard of review under which to evaluate
classifications on the basis of mental retardation, and concluded that the
standard should be rational basis." 0 But the Court went on to say that under
that standard, the mentally retarded would be protected from "invidious
discrimination," and holding in the case before it, that a city could not deny
a license to a group home for retarded persons because of community
prejudice and "undifferentiated fears......
As we look to the results in the earlier cases involving gender
discrimination and discrimination against out-of-wedlock children, as well
as the result of Cleburne,we see that the Court's application of the rational
106. Id.at 72.
107. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (applying the
precedent of Levy, by the fact that in Weber, the Court invalidated a law denying dependent,
unacknowledged out-of-wedlock children recovery of workers' compensation for the death
of their father).
108. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (holding that discrimination against out-ofwedlock children is to be evaluated under the heightened scrutiny of the important and
substantial relationship test).
109. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
110. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. The Court concluded that heightened scrutiny was not
necessary or appropriate. This was because: (1)Mental retardation covered a large and
diverse group with different treatment needs; (2) There has been a positive response to the
problems of mental retardation, which "belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a
corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary"; (3) The mentally retarded
did not constitute a politically powerless group; (4) There was no principled way of
distinguishing the mentally retarded from other groups having similar disabling
characteristics. Id. at 443-46.
111. Id. at 449.
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basis standard of review to evaluate discrimination against identifiable
groups is strongly influenced by the Court's underlying value judgments
about the justification for the particular form of discrimination practiced
against the particular groups. The Court made the same kind of value
judgment in Romer v. Evans" 2 when it first dealt with a constitutional
challenge to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Applying the
rational basis standard of review, the Court held that a Colorado state
constitutional provision depriving homosexual persons of protection under
state anti-discrimination laws was in fact in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." 3 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy, who also
authored the Court's opinion in Lawence, cited Moreno for the proposition
that "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.""' 4 He went on to state that
this was a constitutional provision which identifies persons by a single trait
and then denies them protection across the board, and "it is not within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.""' 5 He concluded the
following: "A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." ' 1 6 In
Romer then, we see the Court applying the rational basis standard of review
to invalidate this form of discrimination against homosexual people.
The Scalia dissent in Romer is even more significant than his dissent in
Lawrence. In Romer, he argued that a political majority should be able to
wage a "culture war" against homosexuality, and that the Court should not
take sides in this "culture war.""'' But the Court has done so, holding in
Romer that the state cannot discriminate against homosexuals because of
hostility to them as a group, and holding in Lawrence that the state cannot
prohibit oral and anal sex between same persons on the ground that it
considers that kind of sex to be "immoral." Thus, whenever the state
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, it must demonstrate that the
discrimination is rationally related to the advancement of a legitimate state
interest. The Court will evaluate the validity of the asserted state interest
with reference to its value judgment that the state cannot discriminate
against homosexual persons because of hostility toward them as a group or
because of the belief that they are engaging in "immoral" conduct.
112. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
113. Id. at 635-36.
114. Id. at 634.
115. Idat 633.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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At this point I will turn to the precise argument that I would make as a
litigating lawyer asserting a constitutional challenge to the refusal of an
American state to permit same-sex persons to marry. The claim would be
that the denial of the right to marry to same-sex persons, a right that is
accorded to opposite-sex persons, deprives same-sex couples of equal
protection of the laws. The two essential components of the argument are:
(1) that the right to marry is a very important individual interest, and samesex persons can benefit from the institution of marriage in the same way as
opposite-sex persons; and (2) that the state has no legitimate interest in
denying the right to marry to same-sex persons.
As a litigating lawyer, I would look first to see if I can find any reported
cases involving a constitutional challenge to a ban on same-sex marriages.
Looking at these cases would help me shape my own constitutional
argument and anticipate the state's argument in trying to defend the ban on
same-sex marriage. At this point in time, I would find two sets of cases: (1)
the decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeals and the British Columbia
Court of Appeals, Canadian intermediate appellate courts, holding that
Canada's ban on same-sex marriages violates the equal protection clause of
the Canadian Charter of Rights;' s and (2) a decision of the Arizona Court
of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, holding that the state's ban on
same-sex marriage did not violate the federal or state constitutions," 9 and
a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, holding, over a strong
dissent, that the state's ban on same-sex marriage was violative of the state
constitution.' 20 The Canadian decisions and the majority opinion of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court follow the same lines. So do the decision of
the Arizona Court of Appeals and the dissenting opinion in the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. Thus, all of these decisions would be helpful
to me in a fashioning my arguments and in anticipating the state's argument

118. Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161 (2003); EGALE Canada, Inc. v.
Canada, 15 B.C.L.R.4th 226 (2003). Canada has a unified court system, in which the same
court decides all questions of federal and provincial law. In Canada, marriage is a federal
power. It is possible that in the wake of these decisions, the Canadian government will seek
a change of the marriage law in Parliament to guarantee all Canadians the right to same-sex
marriage. See id.
119. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. 2003).
120. Goodridge v. Dep't of Mental Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The plaintiffs
in that case sought a declaratory judgment that their exclusion from access to civil marriage
violated the Massachusetts Constitution. The court granted the declaratory judgment, but
then stayed entry of that judgment for 180 days "to permit the Legislature to take action as
it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion." Id. at 970. As to subsequent developments
in Massachusetts, see infra note 153.
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in defense.'
Let me begin with the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals, holding
that denying same-sex persons the right to marry violated equal protection
provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights. The court first noted that the
claim involved marriage solely as a legal institution, and not marriage as a
religious or social institution. 122 It then pointed out that Parliament and the
provincial legislatures "have built a myriad of rights and obligations around
the institution of marriage," that the marriages of opposite-sex couples are
formally recognized by law, 123 and that denying same-sex couples the same
right constitutes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.'2 4 The
court found that the differential treatment between opposite-sex couples and
same-sex couples with respect to the right to marry imposes a burden upon,
or withholds a benefit from, the claimants in a manner that reflects the
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or
that otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the
individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human
being or as a member of Canadian
society, equally deserving of concern,
25
respect, and consideration.
The parts of the Halpern opinion that are most relevant for the
argument in support of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage are those
26
that reject the arguments that the government set forth to justify the ban. 1
121. As a litigating lawyer, I would be bringing the suit in federal court with the
expectation that it would ultimately come before the Supreme Court. Thus, the Canadian and
state court decisions would merit only a footnote reference. The Canadian decisions,
however, would serve another function. Those decisions and the possible subsequent
amendment of the Canadian marriage law to permit same-sex persons to marry mean that
same-sex marriage will exist in our neighbor to the north, and so suggest that it would not
be "too far out" for same-sex marriage to exist in the United States as well.
122. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 177.
123. Id. at 181.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 182.
126. Constitutional analysis under the Canadian Charter of Rights is structurally very
different from constitutional analysis under the United States Constitution. Canadian
constitutionaljurisprudence does not distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental
rights: all rights under the Charter are in theory entitled to the same degree of constitutional
protection. The first part of the constitutional inquiry is whether the law infringes on a right
guaranteed by the Charter. If so, then the court proceeds to the second part of the inquiry,
which is whether the infringement can be justified as a "reasonable limit prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Canadian Charter of
Rights, sec. 1. See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in
Canada: The Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1191 (1984); Robert A. Sedler, The Constitutional Protection ofFreedom of
Religion, Expression, and Association in Canada and the United States: A Comparative
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The first justification was, as we will see, the same one advanced by the
Arizona Court of Appeals in upholding the ban on same-sex marriage:
marriage can be limited to two people who have the ability to procreate
children.127 The Canadian government argued that "[t]he concept of
marriage-across time, societies and legal cultures-is that of an institution
to facilitate, shelter and nurture the unique union of a man and woman who,
together, have the possibility to bear children from their relationship and
shelter them within it.' ' 128 The court's reply to this justification was twofold. First, while "only opposite-sex couples can 'naturally' procreate,
same-sex couples can choose to have children by other means, such as
adoption, surrogacy and donor insemination."' " 9 In this connection, it
should be noted that opposite-sex couples likewise can and do choose to
have children by other means, such as adoption, surrogacy and donor
insemination. In today's world then, couples, whether same-sex or oppositesex, can have children by means other than sexual intercourse, and there is
no longer any necessary connection between sexual intercourse and having
children.
Second, "no one... [was] suggesting that procreation and childrearing
are the only purposes of marriage, or the only reasons why couples choose
to marry."' 30 The Halpern court went on to find that:
[i]ntimacy, companionship, societal recognition, economic benefits,
the blending of two families, to name a few, are other reasons that
couples choose to marry .... same-sex couples are capable of
forming 'long, lasting, loving and intimate relationships.' Denying
same-sex couples the right to marry perpetuates the contrary view,
namely, that same-sex couples . . . are not worthy of
the same
3
respect and recognition as opposite-sex relationships.' '
A final justification advanced by the Canadian government was that the
"rational connection for the opposite-sex nature of marriage is 'selfevident', considering its universality and its effectiveness in bringing the
Analysis, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 577 (1988) (discussing the Canadian Charter of
Rights at an early stage of its development).
127. Halpern,65 O.R.3d at 185-86; Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451,463-64
(Ariz. App. 2003).
128. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 185-86.
129. Id. at 187. The court also noted that, "An increasing percentage of children are
being conceived and raised by same-sex couples."
130. Id.
131. Id.
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two sexes together, in sheltering children, and in providing a stable
institution for society."' 3 2 The court replied that the ban on same-sex
marriage was not rationally connected to the encouragement of procreation
because it was both over-inclusive and under-inclugive. 33 "The ability to
'naturally' procreate and the willingness to raise children are not
prerequisites of marriage for opposite-sex couples."' 3 4 Many opposite-sex
couples are either "unable to have children or choose not to do so," and
conversely, the ban on marriage "excludes same-sex couples that have and
raise children."'' 35 The court also noted that while marriage has indeed been
a stabilizing and effective institution, the same-sex couples were not
seeking to abolish marriage, rather they were seeking access to it, and
marriage would be no less a stabilizing institution if it were expanded to
include same-sex couples.136 The Halpern court concluded that denying
same-sex persons the right to marry could not be justified and deprived
them of equality on the basis of sexual orientation. 131
The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court holding that the
state's ban on same-sex marriage violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Massachusetts Constitution follows the same lines
of the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals. Being an American state
court, however, its analysis of the constitutional question began with the
matter of standards of review. The court held that the rational basis standard
of review was applicable, and that the ban could not withstand rational basis
scrutiny, because the state "has failed to identify any constitutionally
adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples."' 38 The
court began by describing marriage as a "social institution of the highest
importance," 139 and emphasizing the social and legal benefits that flow from
marriage.' 40 The state asserted three justifications for the ban on same-sex
marriage: "(1) providing a 'favorable setting for procreation;' (2) ensuring
the optimal setting for childrearing, which the department defines as a
'two-parent family with one parent of each sex;' and (3) preserving scarce
132. Id. at 194.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 200.
138. Goodridge v. Dep't of Mental Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). The
court found that the ban violated both the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Massachusetts Constitution, noting that in this case the two constitutional concepts
overlapped.
139. Id. at 954.
140. Id. at 954-55.
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state and private financial resources."1 41
In rejecting the first justification, the court pointed out that the legal
institution of marriage was based on the exclusive and permanent
commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not on the begetting
of children.'42 It went on to say that the state affirmatively facilitates
bringing children into a family regardless of whether the intended parent is
married or unmarried, whether the child is adopted or born into a family,
whether assistive technology was used to conceive the child, and whether
the parent or partner is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual.'43 For these
reasons, this justification was not rationally related to the ban on same-sex
marriage. In rejecting the second justification of "optimal setting" for
raising children, the court noted that while protecting the welfare of
children was a paramount state policy, restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples "cannot plausibly further this policy."'" Not only had the state
"responded supportively to 'the changing realities of the American family,
and "moved vigorously to strengthen the modern family in its many
variations,"' 145 but the state "has offered no evidence that forbidding
marriage to people of the same sex will increase the number of couples
choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise
children."' 146 In addition, the state conceded that people in same-sex couples
may be "excellent" parents, and the court noted that the task of childrearing
for same-sex couples "is made infinitely harder by their status as outliers to
the marriage laws."' 14 7 For these reasons, there was no rational relationship
between the ban on same-sex marriage and thejustification ofprotecting the
"optimal" child rearing unit.'4 8 The "preserving resources"justification was
premised on the assumption that same-sex couples were more financially
independent than married couples and thus less needy of "public marital
benefits.'

49

Thisjustification was completely irrational, since it ignored the

fact that many same-sex couples had children, and since the marriage laws
did not condition the receipt of "public marital benefits" on a showing of
need. 5' 0
Finally, the court responded to the argument developed in some of the
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 961.
Id.
Id. at 962.
Id.

145. Id. at 963.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id.
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amici briefs that broadening civil marriage to include same-sex couples
would trivialize or destroy the institution of marriage as it has historically
been fashioned. As did the Ontario Court of Appeals, it found that a change
in the definition of marriage would not "disturb the fundamental value of
marriage in our society," since the plaintiffs did not want to abolish
marriage, but to be permitted to join in it. 5 As the court stated:
If anything, extending civil marriage to same-sex couples
reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and
communities. That same-sex couples are willing to embrace
marriage's solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of
marriage in our laws and in the human spirit. 52
Since the state could not advance any constitutionally adequate reason for
denying civil marriage to same-sex couples, the ban violated
the equal
53
protection and due process clauses of the state constitution.'
The Arizona Court of Appeals, in contrast, upheld the state's ban on
same-sex marriage as being rationally related to the state's interest "in
encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the marital
relationship."' 54 What is most interesting about the opinion overall is its
tone. There is none of the hostility toward homosexuality that was so
evident in the White and Burger opinions in Bowers and in the Scalia
151. Id. at 965.
152. Id.
153. The court stayed the decision for 180 days to afford the legislature the opportunity
to conform the existing marriage statutes to the provisions of its decisions. In the interim a
bill was introduced in the state senate that would preserve marriage as an institution
exclusively for opposite-sex couples, but recognize civil unions for same-sex couples and
provide them with "all the same benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities under law
as are granted to spouses in a marriage." In response to a request by the Senate for an
advisory opinion as to whether the proposed bill would satisfy state constitutional
requirements, the court advised that it would not, because "[t]he bill maintains an
unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory status for same-sex couples." Opinions of the
Justices to the Senate, 2004 Mass. LEXIS 35 at *18 (Mass. Sup. Ct.), Feb. 3, 2004. The
legislature has since proposed an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution that would
incorporate the provisions of the civil marriage bill. However, the proposed amendment
must pass another session of the legislature, and then be approved by the voters, so it could
not go into effect until 2006. As of May 17, 2004, coincidentally the date of the fiftieth
anniversary the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), same-sex persons have been permitted to marry in
Massachusetts.
154. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463-64 (Ariz. App. 2003)
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dissents in Romer and Lawrence. This is not surprising, since after
Lawrence, the state could not try to justify the ban on the ground that it
considered same-sex marriage to be "immoral." Rather the court emphasizes
the deference that it must give to legislative judgment under the rational
basis standard and its reluctance to use the Constitution to resolve such a
controversial question. It is almost as if the court is saying to the same-sex
couple: "We recognize your humanity, and maybe the legislature will allow
you to formalize your relationship in a civil union, or even at some time in
the future in the institution of marriage, but we can't do anything for you
now as a constitutional matter." This is very similar to the position taken by
the dissenters on the Massachusetts Supreme Court: any change in the
nature of the institution of marriage must come from the legislature and the
court will not require it as a constitutional matter.'55
As in the Massachusetts case, the plaintiffs in Standhardtasserted both
a due process and equal protection challenge, the court's analysis was the
same for both challenges,' 56 and the court held that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is evaluated under the rational basis standard of
review.'57 Under that standard, the law is presumed constitutional, so the
challengers had the burden of proving that it was not "related to any
conceivable legitimate state interest."' 58 The court held that it would uphold
the law if there is "a 'reasonable, even though debatable' basis for [its]
enactment."' 5 9 By formulating the rational basis standard of review in this
way, the Standhardtcourt made it clear that it was going to uphold the ban.
Its application of the rational basis standard here clearly differed from the
way that the United States Supreme Court applied rational basis in Romer
and Lawrence. The court accepted the state's "marriage and procreation"
argument:
155. In that case, Justice Cordy concluded his dissent as follows:

[t]his case is not about government intrusions into matters of personal liberty. It
is not about the rights of same-sex couples to choose to live together or to be
intimate with each other, or to adopt and raise children together. It is about
whether the State must endorse and support their choices by changing the

institution of civil marriage to make its benefits, obligations, and responsibilities
applicable to them. While the courageous efforts of many have resulted in
increased dignity, rights, and respect for gay and lesbian members of our
community, the issue presented here is a profound one, deeply rooted in social
policy, that must, for now, be the subject of legislative not judicial action.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Mental Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,1004-05 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
156. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 454, 464.
157. Id. at 460-61.

158. Id. at 461.
159. Id.
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The State contends it has a legitimate interest in encouraging
procreation and child-rearing within the stable environment
traditionally associated with marriage, and that limiting marriage
to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that interest ....
Because the State's interest in committed sexual relationships is
limited to those capable of producing children, it contends
it
60
reasonably restricts marriage to opposite-sex couples.'
The same-sex couple here responded to this argument in the same way as
the same-sex couples in the Canadian cases, arguing that "(1) opposite-sex
couples are not required to procreate in order to marry, and (2) same-sex
couples also raise children, who would benefit from the stability provided
by marriage within the family."' 16' The court responded by invoking rational
basis and deference to legislative judgment: "However, as the State notes,
'[a] perfect fit is not required' under the rational basis test, and we will not
overturn a statute merely because it is not made with 'mathematical nicety,
or because in practice it results in some inequality."1 62 The court also found
that "[a]llowing all opposite-sex couples to enter marriage ...
regardless of
their willingness or ability to procreate, does not defeat the reasonableness
of the link between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and childrearing. ' ' 16 The court supplied three reasons for its finding: (1) privacy
concerns would preclude the state from asking the opposite-sex couples
about their intention to have children before issuing a license,"' (2) "in light
of medical advances affecting sterility, the ability to adopt, and the fact that
intentionally childless couples may ultimately choose to have a child or
have an unplanned pregnancy," it would be nearly impossible for the state
to identify couples who would never bear or raise children, 65 and (3)
"because opposite-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry, excluding
such couples from marriage could only be justified by a compelling state
interest ....,,66

The first fallacy in the court's reasoning here is that the same-sex
couple is not seeking to prevent opposite-sex couples from marrying; the
couple is merely seeking the same access to marriage provided to oppositesex couples. The second fallacy is that precisely because opposite-sex
couples can have children by insemination, adoption or surrogate parenting,
160. Id.
161. Id.at 462.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citation omitted).

165. Id.
166. Id. (citation omitted).
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they are no different from same-sex couples, who can have children in the
same manner. This point completely undercuts the "marriage and
procreation" justification for the ban on same-sex marriage. Since both
opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples can have children by means
other than sexual intercourse, there is no logical "parenting" reason for
denying same-sex persons the same right to marry granted to opposite-sex
persons. These were the positions taken by the Canadian and Massachusetts
courts in holding that there was no constitutionally valid justification for the
ban on same-sex marriage.
The Standhardtcourt acknowledged that while same-sex couples may
also have children (and as stated above that opposite-sex people like samesex people sometimes have children by means other than sexual
intercourse), only opposite-sex couples can have children by sexual
intercourse, and the state could decide that "sanctioning same-sex marriages
would do little to advance the State's interest in ensuring responsible
procreation within committed, long-term relationships.' 67 It is difficult to
see any logical connection here between procreation and committed longterm relationships. Since, as the court recognizes, opposite-sex couples in
committed, long-term relationships sometimes have children without
procreation, same-sex couples who have children without procreation can
also remain in committed long-term relationships. 68 What the court really
seems to be talking about is responsible parenting, and the court does not
suggest, nor could it, that there is any demonstrable connection between
responsible parenting and the manner in which parenting was achieved.
Finally, the Standhardt court acknowledges that "[c]hildren raised in
families headed by a same-sex couple deserve and benefit from bilateral
parenting within long-term, committed relationships just as much as
children with married parents.' ' 69 The court, however, then falls back on
rational basis review, finding that:
although the line drawn between couples who may marry
(opposite-sex) and those who may not (same-sex) may result in
some inequity for children raised by same-sex couples, such
inequity is insufficient to negate the State's link between oppositesex marriage, procreation and child-rearing .... The fact that the
line could be drawn differently is a matter for legislative, rather
than judicial, consideration, as long as plausible reasons exist for
placement of the current line. 7'
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 463.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals is a good indication of
the approach that the state will take to justify its ban on same-sex marriage.
The state will emphasize that the constitutionality of the ban must be
evaluated under the rational basis standard of review and argue that this
standard of review requires some deference to legislative judgment. The
state will then argue that it has a legitimate interest in relating marriage to
procreation and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples who can
procreate "naturally" is rationally related to the advancement of that
interest. In addition, the state may also argue, as did the dissenters in the
Massachusetts case, that it is too early to tell whether families headed by
same-sex parents are as successful in childrearing as families headed by
opposite-sex parents, and that the matter needs more study by the legislature
before making a fundamental alteration to the institution of marriage.171
The counter to the state's arguments along these lines is that a court's
application of the rational basis standard of review should be influenced by
the value judgment that the Supreme Court has made in Romer and
Lawrence: the state's differential treatment of same-sex persons in
comparison to opposite-sex persons has to be objectively reasonable. This
is especially true in regard to marriage, since marriage is a very important
individual interest that the law has always strongly protected for oppositesex persons. Same-sex persons can benefit from being permitted to enter
into the institution of marriage as well, as can children raised in families
headed by a same-sex couple. It is logically irrelevant that same-sex couples
cannot procreate "naturally," since same-sex couples can become parents
by means of artificial insemination, surrogacy and adoption, as do oppositesex parents. More importantly, opposite-sex couples can marry without any
intention or ability to procreate. For all of these reasons, the state's denial
to same-sex persons of the ability to enter into marriage is objectively
unreasonable and thus violates equal protection.
In this writing, I have presented the arguments to support the
proposition that the Constitution should recognize the right to same-sex
marriage. Cases presenting this constitutional claim are beginning to make
their way through the lower courts. At some point in time, such a case likely
will come before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court will
definitively resolve the issue. It is my submission that the Court should
resolve the issue in favor of recognition of the constitutional right of samesex persons to enter into the institution of marriage.

171. 798 N.E.2d at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting).

